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CASE COMMENTS
ADVERSE POSSESSION-AcQUISITION OF TITLE TO MINERALS SUB-
SEQUENT TO SEVERANCE.-D's predecessors in title, claimants under a
senior patent, conveyed the disputed property excepting and reserv-
ing the minerals. P's predecessors in title entered into possession of
the surface as claimants under a junior patent. P seeks a declara-
tory judgment to cancel the severance deed, contending that by
adverse possession of the surface for the statutory period under a
color of title in fee he acquired title to both the surface and the
minerals. Held, that the severance deed was duly accepted and
recorded, but that an adverse possessor of the surface under color
of title in fee and without actual or constructive notice of the
severance acquires title to both the surface and the minerals. Decree
of cancellation granted. Dyer v. United Fuel Gas Co., 90 F. Supp.
859 (S.D. W. Va. 1950).
The prevailing rule is that if the ownership of the minerals
becomes separated from that of the surface, the subsequent posses-
sion of the surface is not regarded as extending to the minerals so
as to affect title under the Statute of Limitations. Kentucky Block
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Cannell Co. v. Sewell, 249 Fed. 840, 1 A.L.R. 556 (1918); Wallace v.
Elm Grove Coal Co., 55 W. Va. 449, 52 S.E. 485, 6 Ann. Cas. 140
(1905); 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 467-471 (3d ed., Jones, 1939);
1 SUMMERS, OIL & GAS 357 (1938).
Since the principal case is an apparent deviation from the pre-
vailing rule, it seems pertinent to examine its supporting authority
in order to ascertain the appropriateness of its conclusion.
The court begins by propounding the rule that since D's sever-
ance deed was not within the chain of title under which the adverse
possessor claimed, the latter was not chargeable with notice of its
provisions. This conclusion was reached by analogy to a prior
decision in the same circuit. There, the owner had executed a
quitclaim deed excepting the minerals, but his prospective grantee
iefused to accept it. The court found that since the evidence con-
clusively rebutted any presumption of an acceptance, there was no
effective severance of the minerals, adding, however, that even if
there had been an acceptance the deed was neither recorded nor in
the adverse possessor's chain of title and by W. VA. CODE c. 40, art. 1,
§15 (Michie, 1949) "... a purchaser shall not ... be affected by the
record of a deed or contract made by a person under whom his
title is not derived." Gill v. Colton, 12 F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 1926).
Having adopted the dictum requiring constructive notice, the
court said that no case could be found ". . . in which it has been
held that a severance deed of which the adverse holder has no notice
or knowledge is effective to prevent the adverse holder's possession
of the surface from extending to the minerals also. It makes no
difference that the severance deed may have been made before
possession began. It may be a perfectly valid deed between the
grantor and the grantee and those claiming under them but as
against one holding adversely under color of a hostile title if the
severance deed is to prevent his actual possession of the surface
from extending to the minerals, notice thereof must in some way
be brought home to him." At 866. To sustain this position the
court cites only Clements v. Texas Co., 273 S.W. 993 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1921). In that case, one in adverse possession conveyed the
mineral rights before the statutory period had fully run, and the
owner contended that since the statute would not run after sever-
ance of the minerals, the adversary's possession did not mature.
The Texas court, in finding that such a severance did not toll the
statute as against the owner, commented extensively on severability.
The court recognized the rule extant in many jurisdictions that
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there can be no adverse possession of minerals after severance by
mere possession of the surface but interpreted the rule as applicable
only between the severor and his privies and the severee and his
privies.
The court in the principal case concluded by asserting that
even in those cases where a severance deed was within the adverse
possessor's chain of title notice was essential, citing Miller v. Esta-
brook, 273 Fed. 143 (4th Cir. 1920); Huntington Development &
Gas Co. v. Stewart, 44 F.2d 119 (4th Cir. 1930); Stowers v. Hunting-
ton Development & Gas Co., 72 F.2d 969 (4th Cir. 1934). However,
a perusal of these cases shows that in each instance there had been
a severance of minerals and a subsequent transfer of the surface;
and, although the courts assert the need for actual or constructive
notice to the adverse possessor by way of dicta, they found by
vigorous search a recorded or quasi-recorded severance. See
SUMMERS, supra at 357 n. 71.
From this resume of the court's opinion and authority there
emerge two salient facts: (1) in each instance the authority cited
has been mere dicta; (2) from an assertion that all cases known to
the court to have deprived the adverse possessor of title to the
severed minerals show actual or constructive notice to that possessor,
the court concluded that notice was essential to such deprivation.
A notable feature of the principal case is the degree to which
the court and its cited authority are engrossed in the protection of
a purchaser without notice, affording to him in every instance the
statutory protection against all deeds not in his chain of title. The
court looks at W. VA. CODE c. 40, art. 1, §15 (Michie, 1949) and
offers an avowed adverse possessor its full protection. It is sub-
mitted that such protection is not a proper application of the
statute since the preceding section defines purchasers ". . . to extend
to and embrace all ... purchasers who but for the deed ... would
have had title to the property conveyed." W. VA. CODE c. 40, art 1,
§ 14 (Michie, 1949). It is submitted that but for the severance deed
this purchaser still would not have gained title to the minerals by
virtue of his junior patent but only by complying with the requi-
sites for acquiring title by adverse possession. That is to say, the
claimant stands not as a purchaser but as a possessor. And seeking
the protection of W. VA. CODE C. 55, art. 2, §1 (Michie, 1949), he
must meet its requirements.
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The elements of adverse possession have often been defined by
our court. In Core v. Faupel, 24 W. Va. 238 (1884), the court re-
quired a possession: (1) hostile or adverse, (2) actual, (3) visible,
notorious and exclusive, (4) continuous, and (5) under a color or
claim of title. All these must concur for the full statutory period.
Their essence is notice to the owner by affirmative acts of the ad-
verse claimant. Nothing is required of the owner. Indeed, it is
the failure of the owner to act which permits the adverse holder
to acquire title. The requisite possession ". . . depends on the acts
of the junior claimant and not on things left undone by the senior
claimant." Wilson v. Braden, 56 W. Va. 372, 381, 49 S.E. 409, 413
(1904). When the federal district court attempts to bring a pur-
chaser, with or without notice, within the statute it must overcome
the fundamental principle that an owner must have a right of action
against the intruder at all times during the statutory period. Sperry
v. Swiger, 54 W. Va. 284, 46 S.E. 125 (1903); Core v. Faupel, Wilson
v. Braden, both supra. Quaere, what act of a surface owner (other
that the actual removal of the minerals) is inconsistent with that
of the owner of minerals in place?
It is surprising that the court in the principal case did not give
weight to the extensive commentaries in West Virginia cases to the
effect that the adverse possessor cannot acquire title to minerals
previously severed without physically appropriating them. Wallace
v'. Elm Grove Coal Co., supra; Plant v. Humphries, 66 W. Va. 88, 66
S.E. 94, 26 L.R.A. (N.s.) 558 (1909); Thomas v. Young, 93 W. Va.
555, 117 S.E. 909 (1923); Vance v. Clark, 252 Fed. 495 (S.D. W. Va.
1918) (even limited mining did not suffice).
In the Wallace case, supra at 453, 52 S.E. at 486, the court said
that by the great weight of authority the adverse possessor could
acquire no title to underlying coal previously served by his actual
and exclusive possession of the surface, citing 1 Cyc. 994, ". . . when
by conveyance or reservation separation takes place of ownership
of surface from minerals, the mineral owner must be disseized to
lose his right and no disseisin by an act which does not actually
take the minerals out of his possession will suffice." And when P
sought to secure the minerals by contending that after severance
they were forfeited to the state, the court held that the forfeiture
was immaterial since the claimant had no possession of the coal,
the only thing thereafter that could ripen a mere color of title into
a good legal title. Cf. Kiser v. McLean, 67 W. Va. 294, 298, 67 S.E.
725, 726 (1910).
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The need of physical appropriation is even more forcefully
illustrated by the Plant case, supra. There a guardian severed the
infant's coal. Subsequent to his majority the former infant sought
to cancel the deed for fraud. When challenged for laches, the
infant sought to defend on the ground that he had at all times been
in possession of the surface. The court held, however, that after
severance, the possession of the surface was not possession of the
underlying coal, and the surface owner must show that he had had
actual physical possession of the coal apart from the surface.
It is submitted that these cases emphasize the attitude of the
state court in requiring actual possession of the severed mineral
interest as a requisite for the acquisition of a possessory statutory
title, and that the introduction of actual or constructive notice to
the adverse claimant is primarily a result of misapplication of the
statutes as to bona fide purchasers and antithetical to the theory of
adverse possession. It is interesting to note that the decision in the
principal case is not in accord with the principle recently incor-
porated into our statutes that ". . . ownership or possession of the
surface after severance shall not be adverse to the interests of the
owner or owners of such minerals and appurtenant rights." W. VA.
CODE c. 55, art. 2, § la (Michie, 1949).
N. E. R.
CHARITIES-CHAiTABLE CORPORAnONs-LIAMILITY FOR ToRTs.-
A, while attending B university, was injured when a trapeze sup-
plied by her instructor collapsed. A brought action against B
university for injuries sustained. The university averred that it
was a charitable corporation and therefore not liable for torts of
its agents and contended that this defense, where interposed, was
absolute. A contended that there were non-trust funds from which
to collect a judgment. The issue was whether a judgment in an
action in tort could be obtained against a charitable corporation
for the negligence of its servants where that corporation was pro-
tected by liability insurance. The trial court dismissed the action
and this was affirmed by the appellate court. Judgment reversed
on appeal. Held, that the question of protecting the trust funds
did not affect the liability of the institution, but only the manner
of collecting any judgment that might be obtained. Moore v. Moyle.,
92 N.E.2d 81 (Ill. 1950) (5-2 decision).
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